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AREA PRICE REGULATION OF GAS PRODUCER RATES
BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION
BY CHARLES I. FRANCIS*
Federal Power Commission regulation of independent producers' of
natural gas under the Natural Gas Act 2 currently grows into one of the
country's more controversial areas of legal concern. During the last decade
a majority of the Commission's opinions in contested producer rate and
certificate cases have been appealed by either the producers, the gas distribut-
ing companies, or the public service commissions of the consuming states.
In many instances the appellate courts have reversed and remanded the
Commission's opinions with only the vaguest instructions as to how the
Commission should proceed in the performance of its gargantuan task of
regulating the thousands of producers scattered throughout the gas-producing
states.
The embittered legal struggle between the producers and representatives
of the consumers of natural gas resulted in a staggering backlog of cases on
the Commission's dockets.8 The Commission, steadily falling further behind
in its work-load, was attacked as the outstanding example in the federal
government of the breakdown of the administrative process.
4
In an imaginative effort to extricate itself from this chaos of legal con-
* A.B., 1915, University of Texas; LL.B., LL.M., 1917, University of Texas;
Counsel to the President and Director of Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation
(formerly General Counsel).
The author acknowledges the contributions in researching this Article of Jack D.
Head, General Counsel of Texas Eastern, and his assistant, Bolivar C. Andrews, both
of Houston, Texas.
1. The Commission defines "independent producer" to mean any person "who is
engaged in the production or gathering of natural gas and who sells natural gas in
interstate commerce for resale, but who is not engaged in the transportation of natural
gas . . . by pipeline in interstate commerce." 18 C.F.R. § 154.91 (Supp. 1963).
2. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1958).
3. As of the date of the decision in Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960),
there were 3,372 independent producers who had 11,091 rate schedules on file and 33,231
supplements to those rate schedules. With regard to rate filings alone, there were 570
producers involved in 3,278 rate increase filings that were awaiting hearings and decisions.
The Commission predicted that if its staff were tripled, producer rate work would
achieve a current status by 2043 A.D. Id. at 545-46.
4. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, submitted by
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure to the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate (Dec. 1960).
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flict, the Commission on September 28, 1960, promulgated a Statement of
General Policy 5 inaugurating a unique concept-regulating prices paid pro-
ducers on the basis of area rates. In this Statement of Policy, since amended
several times, the Commission designated twenty-three different natural-gas-
producing areas and established ceiling-price levels for initial and increased
rate filings by producers in each producing area. The Commission announced
it would institute a series of hearings to determine fair prices for gas "based
on reasonable financial requirements of the industry" for each of the pro-
ducing areas of the country.
The general concept of regulation through area pricing has received
approval from the courts; but it is certain that the practical application of
this new type of regulation will be challenged from many quarters. Before
discussing the knotty problems which courts must ultimately unravel, a
review of the maelstrom of events leading to the adoption of area pricing
may be helpful for those not previously exposed to the intricacies of pro-
ducer regulation.
7
HISTORY OF COST-OF-SERVICE REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT IRODUCERS
The Natural Gas Act, passed in 1938, culminated a congressionally
authorized investigation of the interstate gas-pipeline industry by the Federal
Trade Commission. In view of the purpose of the investigation,8 the report
of the Federal Trade Commission, and the ultimate design of the act itself,
it was the almost universal view that only interstate gas pipeline companies
were to be regulated. Support for the belief that field sales of natural gas
escaped control under the legislation came from the stipulation of section
1(b) 9 that "the provisions of this Act. . .shall not apply. . . to the produc-
tion or gathering of natural gas." Shortly after the passage of the act in
Matter of Columbian Fuel Corp.,10 and on several subsequent occasions, the
Commission held field sales of natural gas by producers to be outside the
agency's jurisdiction. Doubts as to this exclusion first became apparent in
1946 as the result of a court decision holding within Commission jurisdic-
tion a pipeline company's field sales to nonaffiliated purchasers." This deci-
sion brought prompt action by the Commission to assure producers that it
5. 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
6. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 547 (1960).
7. See generally Mosburg, Regulation of the Independent Producer by the Federal
Power Commission, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 249 (1963).
8. S. Doc. No. 92, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935).
9. 52 Stat. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1958).
10. 2 F.P.C. 200 (1940).




would not exercise jurisdiction over their sales ;12 and in 1950 Congress
passed the Kerr-Harris Bill' 3 expressly placing this situation outside Com-
mission jurisdiction, but this bill was vetoed by President Truman. 4
Immediately following veto of the bill the Commission announced that
investigations of producer sales would be made where the price appeared
excessive. An investigation of the prices charged pipeline companies by
Phillips Petroleum Company was instituted. After completing its review
of Phillips' prices the Commission held in Phillips Petroleum Co.,15 for what
proved to be the last time, that jurisdiction was absent, because Phillips' sales
were made as a part of the gathering and production of gas. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The
Supreme Court, first denying certiorari but then persuaded to reconsider,
affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. Divided five-to-three the Su-
preme Court held that Congress had expressed in the act an intent to regulate
sales by independent producers of natural gas which would be resold in inter-
state commerce.
Commission regulation of producers remained in effect suspended for a
time following the Phillips Petroleum case; the Commission and the industry
renewed their efforts to secure remedial legislation. Congress responded by
passing the Harris-Fulbright Bill in 1955,16 which would have freed the pro-
ducer from utility-type regulation, but preserved for the Commission the
right to regulate producer contract prices. President Eisenhower, while cogni-
zant of a need for legislation of this type, vetoed the bill for reasons apart from
its merits. 17 Efforts to pass similar legislation persist, but without success.' 8
Veto of the Harris-Fulbright Bill left the Commission faced again with
the problem of independent producer regulation, an almost impossible under-
taking within the framework of the Natural Gas Act which was designed to
regulate an entirely different business-the transportation and sale of gas by
interstate pipeline companies. The broad directive of the act did not make the
12. The Superior Oil Co., 7 F.P.C. 627 (1948); General Crude Oil Co., 7 F.P.C.
1024 (1948) ; La Gloria Corp., 7 F.P.C. 349 (1948); R. J. & D. E. Whelan, 6 F.P.C. 672
(1947); Hassie Hunt Trust, 6 F.P.C. 835 (1947); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co.,
6 F.P.C. 664 (1947); The Chicago Corp., 6 F.P.C. 98 (1947); Fin-Ker Oil & Gas
Production Co., 6 F.P.C. 92 (1947) ; 18 C.F.R. § 2.54 (1947).
13. H.R. 1758, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950).
14. H.R. Doc. No. 555, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-3 (1950).
15. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 F.P.C. 246 (1951), rev'd sub. nom. Wisconsin v.
FPC, 205 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 896 (1953), cert. granted, 346
U.S. 934 (1954), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672
(1954).
16. H.R. 6645, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
17. H.R. REP. No. 837, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957).
18. Heard, Pending Legislation to Amend the Natural Gas Act, in OIL AND GAS
OPraATIONS 406-34 (Slovenko ed. 1963).
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Commission's task easier: sections 419 and 520 provide only that the rates of
natural gas companies shall be "just and reasonable," prescribing no formula
or method for arriving at the determination.
21
In previous rate regulation of pipeline companies, including regulation
of gas production activities conducted by the pipelines, the Commission had
adopted the so-called cost-of-service method, employing rates designed to
permit a pipeline to recover its outlays plus a return on a rate base computed
by totaling the depreciated original costs of properties devoted to jurisdic-
tional service. 22 Approving the Commission's use of this method the Supreme
Court in the now famous case of FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 23 stated:
Under the statutory standard of "just and reasonable" it is the
result reached not the method employed which is controlling ...
It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts.
If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust
and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end. The
fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain in-
firmities is not then important.
24
Mr. Justice Jackson dissented insofar as the Hope decision sustained the cost-
of-service-method-
Is it necessary to a "reasonable" price for gas that it be an-
chored to a rate base of any kind? ... Gas is what Hope sells and
it can be directly priced more reasonably and easily and accurately
than the components of a rate base can be valued. Hence the reason
for resort to a roundabout way of rate base price fixing does not
exist in the case of gas in the field.
26
The Colorado Interstate Gas Company also challenged utilization of
a rate-base calculation for production and gathering facilities.26 Colorado
Interstate was a "natural gas company" as defined by the act, and the
majority did not believe the production and gathering exemption of section
19. 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958).
20. 52 Stat. 823 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1958).
21. FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942).
22. See the author's Federal Regulation of Interstate Shipment and Sale of Gas, in
FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAXATION 103 (1953); Rate Regu-
lation of Natural Gas Companies by the Federal Power Commission, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 413 (1954).
23. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
24. 320 U.S. at 602. The Commission's continued adherence to the depreciated
original cost method, approved in this case, as opposed to the fair present value method,
has received a great deal of criticism, because the former approach fails to recognize the
continuing inflationary spiral, resulting in rates that may be confiscatory. Supra note 22;
see Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 248 Iowa 1201, 85 N.W.2d 28
(1957).
25. 320 U.S. at 647-48.
26. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
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1(b) precluded the Commission in its rate computations from considering
all the gas properties employd in gas production by a company subject to
the act. Congress might have excluded producing or gathering facilities
from the base and made an allowance in operating expenses for the fair field
price of gas as a commodity. Observing that some thought that to be the
wiser course, the Court failed to find any mandate to that effect in the
act. Rather, the provisions of the act suggested Congress had thought in
terms of ingredients of the customary rate base; referring to the "end result"
test of Hope, the Court noted that if the Commission abandoned rate-base
valuation, the act did not say gas would have to be valued at the fair field
price.2 7 Thus, in a somewhat defensive manner, application of the rate-base,
method to gas production was justified. In view of more recent developments
the dictum qualifying the Court's holding is of extreme interest. "We do not
say that the Commission lacks the authority to depart from the rate-base
method. We only hold that the Commission is not precluded from using
it . .. ",28
Not until 1954, just a few weeks before the Supreme Court handed
down its epochal Phillips decision, did the Commission decide to price a
pipeline company's gas directly by adopting a "fair field price" formula in
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co.29 Among the considerations leading to the
new approach was the Commission's determination that gas production by
pipelines should be encouraged in order to reduce their dependency upon
independent producers for gas. The Panhandle decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in what is known as
the City of Detroit30 case. Although refusing to interpret prior decisions to
mean that use of the field price was prohibited, making the rate-base method
mandatory for all properties in all circumstances, the court failed to find
abandonment of the treatment historically accorded pipeline-produced gas
in rate-making justified on this record. The rate-base method was not the
only one available under the statute, but the court believed it "essential in
such a case as this that it be used as a basis of comparison." 3' Because of
the method's repeated use by the Commission and approval by the courts,
the court said, "Unless it is continued to be used at least as a point of depar-
27. Id. at 601-03.
28. Id. at 601.
29. 13 F.P.C. 53 (1954).
30. City of Detroit v. FPC, 230 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
829 (1956). For a discussion of this and other cases concluding that they do not require
a rate-base approach for the independent producer, see Orn, FPC Excursion Into New
Regulatory Fields, in FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND
TAXATION 71 (1963).
31. 230 F.2d at 818.
1§641
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ture, the whole experience under the Act is discarded and no anchor, as it
were, is available by which to hold the terms 'just and reasonable' to some
recognizable meaning.
32
The Solicitor General refused to sign the Commission's petition for a
writ of certiorari in City of Detroit, and, ultimately the Supreme Court denied
the writ. Consequently, the first attempt by the Commission to depart from
the rate-base method in fixing rates for gas production in the field was
thwarted.3 3 In view of the advent of producer regulation during the City of
Detroit litigation it is perhaps unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not
choose to hear that case.
The Commission cited City of Detroit as controlling in its first significant
producer decision holding that cost of service evidence must be considered at
least as a basis of comparison; reliance solely on field-price evidence was in-
adequate.a4 On appeal the Fifth Circuit in Bel Oil Corp. v. FPC,3 5 followed
in a series of Fifth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit decisions, 6
appeared to view as nonessential the traditional utility approach to producer
rate regulation; the choice of methods rested with the Commission. Episcopal
Theological Seminary v. FPC,3 7 decided by the same court, did hold that a
fair balance between the producer and consumer interest could not be achieved
without any evidence respecting investment or costs, but the court decisions
uniformly disclose at least permissive indulgence for a retreat from tradi-
tional cost-of-service methods, a trend recently demonstrated by the District
of Columbia Circuit in Minneapolis Gas Co. v. FPC.a8 There, the court read
its City of Detroit opinion as meaning "there may be situations in which rate-
base proof constitutes the only 'anchor' "; it was for the Commission to de-
cide in the first instance whether rate-base proof was necessary in a particular
case.3 9 The court approved of the attitude taken by the Fifth Circuit in Bel
Oil v. FPC40 and Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC.41 A significant excerpt from
Forest Oil reads-
32. Id. at 818-19.
33. For a comprehensive treatment of cases construing the act to require a rate-base
approach, see Kaye, Are "Conventional Methods" Necessary In Natural Gas Rate Regu-
lation, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 438 (1956).
34. Union Oil Co., 16 F.P.C. 100 (1956).
35. 255 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 804 (1958).
36. Minneapolis Gas Co. v. FPC, 294 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Episcopal
Theological Seminary v. FPC, 269 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895
(1959) ; Forest Oil Corp. v. FPC, 263 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Associated Oil & Gas Co.
v. FPC, 255 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Bel Oil Corp. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 804 (1958) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1958)
Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 255 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1958).
37. Supra note 36.
38. 294 F.2d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
39. Id. at 216.
40. 255 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 804 (1958).
41. 263 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1959).
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We do not think that either the Commission or the petitioner
should be baffled or handicapped in this new field of regulation by
any formulas by whatever name they are known. Specifically, if
there is an accounting or rate-making formula known to the public
utilities industry as a "conventional rate-base method of rate-mak-
ing" which the Commission in its order of dismissal in this case said
must be used at least as a basis of comparison or point of departure,
we say the Commission need not require it unless such method is
the only way by which the Commission can make its required deter-
mination.
42
Earlier, in its Bel Oil decision the court thought it to be quite clear that "the
Commission might adopt some pragmatic standard to apply to these cases." 43
Struggling, along with the courts, for a solution to the producer rate
problem, the Commission found itself confronted with rate schedule filings
numbering in the thousands submitted by several thousand producer "natural
gas companies." Although cases indicated some leeway was available, none
of them specified the kind of evidence required for a proper determination
of the "justness and reasonableness" of producer rates. Not sure how to
proceed, the Commission considered evidence relating to every possible theory
of regulation; confusion reigned.
HISTORY OF CERTIFICATE REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS
Seeking a workable means of regulating the rates of existing producer
sales to interstate pipeline companies, the Commission paid scant attention to
the prices received by producers for the new sales of gas that occurred after
the Phillips decision. Although a producer is required to obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity from the Commission under section 744
of the Natural Gas Act before commencing a new sale of gas, the Commis-
sion announced that it did not deem "it prudent to expend the time required
to resolve rate issues at this stage nor has . . . [the Commission] found it
practical to inquire into the reasonableness of producer rates in' all producer
certificate proceedings. ' 45 Despite vigorous consumer protests, the Commis-
42. Id. at 626.
43. 255 F.2d at 554.
44. 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(f) (1958). See Mosburg,
supra note 7, at 260-76 for a thorough discussion of producer certificate regulation.
45. Anthony J. Tamborello, 14 F.P.C. 123, 126 (1955). Actually, American La.
Pipe Line Co., 13 F.P.C. 380 (1954) was the first producer certificate decision after
the 1954 Phillips decision subjected producers to regulation under the act, and the Com-
mission there refused to impose a price condition. Subsequent decisions following the
policy reflected in Tamborello include: Trunkline Gas Co., 21 F.P.C. 704 (1959);
Seaboard Oil Co., 19 F.P.C. 416 (1958); Southern Natural Gas Co., 18 F.P.C. 38
(1957) ; Houston Texas Gas & Oil Corp., 16 F.P.C. 118 (1956), aff'd sub noma. Florida
Economic Advisory Council v. FPC, 251 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
959 (1958) ; The Atlantic Refining Co., 14 F.P.C. 480 (1955).
1964]
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sion believed that it could defer a determination as to the reasonableness of
prices until subsequent rate proceedings under section 4 or 5 of the act.46
The attempt by the Commission to postpone consideration of producer rates
in certificate cases came to an abrupt halt with the Supreme Court's decision
in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 47 the so-called "Catco" case.
The Court recognized that section 7 of the act imposed no requirement
on the Commission to determine the justness and reasonableness of rates in
certificate proceedings; however, the Court recognized also that proposed
initial prices were a consideration of prime importance in view of the fact
that gas prices had vaulted from one plateau to another. Increasing the con-
sideration's importance was the lack of power in the Commission to suspend
initial rates under section 7 and the delay before the section 5 proceeding,
under which initial certificated rates are reviewable without any refund
protection.
Observing the Commission's authorization under section 7(e) 4 to
impose such conditions on certificates as the public convenience and necessity
required, the Court remarked-
Where the proposed price is not in keeping with the public in-
terest because it is out of line or because its approval might result in
a triggering of general price rises or an increase in the applicant's
existing rates by reason of "favored nation" clauses or otherwise,
the Commission in the exercise of its discretion might attach such
conditions as it believes necessary.
49
The Court thought conditions could protect the consuming public until
the justness and reasonableness of the price fixed by the parties had been
determined under other sections of the act. Exercise of this power by the
Commission would not constitute an infringement on the Court's landmark
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp.50 decision holding
that the act preserves the integrity of individual contracts, which initially
determine the prices.
That the Commission did not interpret Catco as a strict requirement to
"hold the line" in certificating initial prices became evident in the agency's
first post-Catco decision concerning initial prices.51 This limited reading of
46. There was one significant instance during this period in which the Commission
chose to condition a producer's initial price. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 14 F.P.C. 134 (1955),
aff'd sub nom. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 923 (1957). In this case the price was conditioned on evidence that the proposed
price would constitute a new high, and stimulate favored nation clauses in a particular
region of Oklahoma.
47. 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
48. 56 Stat. 84 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958).
49. 360 U.S. at 391.
50. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
51. South Ga. Natural Gas Co., 22 F.P.C. 211 (1959). In this decision prices in
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the case became more apparent when five separate decisions, all issued on
August 10, 1959, authorized a series of, producer sales without conditioning
the contract prices. 52 The subsequent reversal of these five decisions made
it clear that Catco had sharply diminished the freedom exercised by the
Commission in certificating initial prices. 53 The courts would require the
agency to actively utilize its conditioning powers with respect to the price
at which new gas enters the interstate market.
In terms of workload alone the reversals increased substantially the
burdens of Commission and producer alike; in addition, the general lan-
guage employed in the opinions left unanswered many questions as to the
nature and quantum of evidence required in certificate cases. With this
background of uncertainty and confusion the Commission's Statement of
General Policy No. 61-154 and the Phillips decision on remand55 came down
simultaneously on September 28, 1960, heralding a new era of producer
regulation.
REGULATION UNDER THE STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY
The Supreme Court's Phillips decision in 1954 forced the Commission
into the task of producer regulation. It was perhaps fitting that the agency
utilized the opinion in the remanded Phillips case as a vehicle for announce-
ment in 1960 of the new concept of regulating producer rates through area
prices.
Following remand of the case, the Commission consolidated the section
5 investigation of Phillips' rates with several section 4 rate increases filed by
Phillips. 56 After the almost interminable hearings considering primarily cost-
the same range as those struck down in Catco were certificated. The Commission believed
this to be within its discretion in considering all facets of the "public convenience and
necessity." The principal support for this conclusion came from a decision of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, which was handed down shortly after the Supreme Court's
Catco decision and which interpreted it in a limited manner. United Gas Improvement
Co. v. FPC, 269 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the
Third Circuit's judgment, and directed that court to remand the case to the Commission
for redetermination in the light of Catco. Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 361 U.S. 195
(1959).
52. These decisions relied heavily on the decision of the court of appeals in the
United Gas Improvement case, supra note 51.
53. United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 823 (1961) ; United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 290 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965 (1961); United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 287 F.2d
159 (10th Cir. 1961) ; Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 287 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 880, 882 (1961) ; United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d
817 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 879, 881 (1961).
54. 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).
55. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
56. Section 5 of the act, 52 Stat. 823 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1958)
permits the Commission to hold a hearing to establish "just and reasonable" rates "to
be thereafter observed." The provision operates prospectively only. A decrease may be
ordered if existing rates "are not the lowest reasonable rates."
1964]
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of-service evidence, the record in Phillips provided ample justification for the
adoption of a more workable substitute for the individual, cost-of-service
approach to producer regulation. In enumerating some of the many short-
comings of that approach, the Commission mentioned the difficult problem
of allocating costs between a producer's unregulated oil and regulated gas
operations, the lack of preciseness in estimating oil and gas reserves, the
absence of utility characteristics in the producing business, and the intolerable
administrative burden of establishing the cost of service for each of thousands
of producers. The Commission also pointed out that the cost-of-service ap-
proach would penalize the efficient or fortunate producer while rewarding
the inefficient or unfortunate producer. Finally, it was noted that the cost-
of-service approach resulted in widely varying prices for different producers
in the same area or field and many times for different ownerships in gas
produced from the same well.
57
The Commission held cost-of-service evidence for the 1954 test year
to be stale for the purpose of judging Phillips' revenue requirements for
1960 and future years, and dismissed the section 5 aspect of the case; how-
ever, the agency utilized the cost-of-service evidence to allow section 4
increases filed by Phillips for prior years. It was pointed out th;'t utiliza-
tion of a unit-cost, calculated by making numerous arbitrary allocations and
estimates, did not satisfactorily solve the problem of fixing prices:
Experience of the Commission in this case, as well as in
many other producer rate cases during the last five years, has
shown, beyond any doubt, that the traditional original cost, prudent
investment rate base method of regulating utilities is not a sensible,
or even a workable method of fixing the rates of independent pro-
ducers of natural gas.
58
Finding calculation of the unit cost of gas entirely unsatisfactory,
the Commission stated its intention to continue to make use of cost data,
but only as a part of the body of information pertaining to the economics
of the gas-producing industry in an effort to establish fair prices for gas
"based on reasonable financial requirements of the industry" 59 rather than on
the rate base and expenses of each producer. The Commission announced in
its opinion the concurrent issuance of the Policy Statement setting forth for
each of the various producing areas of the country: "(1) a price applicable
Section 4, 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958) provides that
a company may file for an increase in its rates, and for collection of the increased rate
subject to refund of any amounts found after a hearing to be in excess of the "just and
reasonable" rate. Then, the "just and reasonable" test is applied under both sections
with the burden of proof on the Commission under § 5 and on the company under § 4.
57. 24 F.P.C. at 542-45.
58. Id. at 542.
59. Id. at 547.
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to new contracts above which we will not certificate new sales without
justification of the price; (2) a price pertaining to existing contracts, above
which we shall suspend price escalations."60
In the Statement the Commission announced it would institute area rate
proceedings wherein interested parties could challenge the price levels or
geographical makeup of the areas of production established. The interim price
levels reflected six years' experience regulating producers under the act,
and were based upon a consideration of cost information from the following
significant sources: all decided and pending cases,61 existing and historical
price structures, volumes of production and the markets available for the
gas, and trends in production, prices, demand, and exploration and develop-
ment.62 The Policy Statement emphasized that the price levels did not repre-
sent an adjudication of "just and reasonable" rates; "guideline" prices would
be employed to determine whether initial prices were "in line" and whether
proposed increases under existing contracts should be allowed without sus-
pension.
The initial prices established by the statement for new sales ranged from
a high of 26.8 cents per thousand cubic feet for gas produced in the West
Virginia area to a low of 12.7 cents per thousand cubic feet for gas produced
in the San Juan Basin area of New Mexico; the range for increases under
existing contracts rose to a high of 23.9 cents for the West Virginia area,
and fell to a low, applicable to several areas, of 11 cents. Eight amendments
followed the Policy Statement principally in order to make ex parte reduc-
tions in the initial guideline prices established for southern Louisiana and
areas along the Texas Gulf Coast. The Commission has also authorized small
increases above guideline prices pertaining to existing contracts in situations
where the producers agreed to eliminate all or specified price-escalation clauses.
In accordance with its statement the Commission has permitted rate
increases to become effective where new rates did not exceed guideline prices;
the agency has granted also temporary certificates for new sales without re-
60. Ibid.
61. In what has been described as a confession of error, the Commission has for
administrative reasons continued to decide those producer cases which were pending
before it, prior to the commencement of area rate proceedings, on the basis of cost-of-
service evidence. The Commission has believed it should salvage what it could in these
proceedings, but in none of them has the § 5 aspect been decided. See, e.g., Con-
tinental Oil Co., Opinion No. 405 (1963) ; Slade, Inc., 29 F.P.C. 11 (1963) ; H. L. Hunt,
28 F.P.C. 897 (1962); Hunt Oil Co., 28 F.P.C. 623 (1962) ; Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp.,
26 F.P.C. 943 (1961) ; Alfred Glassel, 25 F.P.C. 1071 (1961). It should be noted that a
number of these proceedings have been terminated by settlement agreements.
62. The Commission has never disclosed the information and evidence which formed
the basis for its establishment of the interim price levels, and producer efforts to subpoena
the Commission's files for the production of such evidence have thus far failed. Texaco
v. FPC, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2194 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1963), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WzK
3211 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1963).
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quiring price justification when the initial prices were at or below guideline
levels, and issued permanent certificates conditioned on the maintenance of
guideline prices.6
3
That the "in line" price determined after the statutory hearing for a
permanent certificate might be lower than the "guideline" price became ap-
parent in a Commission decision recently affirmed by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals :64 The court held that a guideline price of 18 cents estab-
lished by the Commission's Policy Statement for Texas Railroad Commission
District 4 was not necessarily the "in line" price required by the Catco deci-
sion, and affirmed the Commission's conditioning the issuance of permanent
certificates on price reductions of as much as 3 cents below the guideline
prices previously authorized under temporary certificates. The decision held
also that the Commission's authority to condition a permanent certificate
under section 7(c) of the act included the power to require refunds of
amounts collected under a temporary certificate in excess of the permanently
certificated price. Power to impose this condition does not depend upon the
existence of an explicit refund provision in the temporary certificate. This
decision appears in conflict with an earlier decision 65 of the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, holding that even in attaching a refund condition to
a temporary certificate the Commission must set a price at or below which
the producer can sell without risk of a subsequent refund order on the
theory that without such a refund floor the producer could not intelligently
decide whether to accept the conditional grant and commit his gas reserves
to the interstate market.
After setting up interim, guideline-area prices, on December 23, 1960,
the Commission instituted the first proceeding to determine just and reason-
able rates for a producing area, 66 the Permian Basin Area of Texas and
New Mexico. A second proceeding instituted on May 10, 1961, contemplated
just and reasonable rates for the South Louisiana Area,6 7 and on November
27, 1963, two new area rate proceedings were issued for the Hugoton-
Anadarko Area including Kansas and parts of Oklahoma and Texas and the
Texas Gulf Coast Area consisting of three Texas Railroad Commission
Districts."8
63. Atlantic Refining Co. v. FPC, 316 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1963). While some of the
earlier court decisions contained statements favorable to the Policy Statement, this recent
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit for the first time approved a conditional rate
as in conformance with the Catco requirements where the Commission had used the area
pricing approach.
64. Skelly Oil Co., 28 F.P.C. 401 (1962), aff'd sub non. Public Serv. Comm'n v.
FPC, No. 17582, D.C. Cir., Jan. 23, 1964.
65. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 270 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1959).
66. Area Rate Proceeding, 24 F.P.C. 1121 (1960).
67. Area Rate Proceeding, 25 F.P.C. 942 (1961).
68. Area Rate Proceeding, 28 Fed. Reg. 12645 (1963).
[Vol. 68
GAS PRODUCER RATES
The Permian Basin hearing, completed with a record of over 30,000
pages, represents a pilot proceeding, determining the factors and evidence
to be considered in establishing just and reasonable area rates. During the
hearing the Commission ruled upon a motion certified to it by the examiner
that individual cost-of-service evidence could not be introduced "regardless
of whether such studies relate to the operations of an individual producer
or to any group or groups of the producers here involved."6 9 The agency
later modified that ruling, permitting parties to "introduce' in evidence com-
posite rate base cost of service studies relating to a significant segment of
industry operations in this area." °70 Curiously, the order added that "such
composite rate base cost of service studies may not suffer from the deficiencies
which exist in individual company studies of this type." Except for the ex-
clusion of individual cost-of-service studies, the record in the Permian Basin
proceeding reflects almost every conceivable evidentiary approach for arriv-
ing at "fair prices for gas based on reasonable financial requirements of the
industry"; the record achieved resulted from a uniquely cooperative effort.
Intense disagreement arose, however, over the proper resolution of the
issues:71 Aside from the contention advanced by some that the proceeding
should be dismissed outright, the recommendations as to the order which
should be adopted range far and wide. Considerable controversy exists con-
cerning the type of area rate determination the Commission should make,
as well as over the scope and effect to be given to the determination.
In view of the divergent approaches and contentions the writer will not
be so bold as to attempt to predict the course or rationale which the Com-
mission might follow in arriving at its determination of just and reasonable
rates for this area. However, it appears litigation will inevitably flow from
any course the Commission chooses. A discussion of the legal problems the
courts must eventually resolve follows.
IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 1963 PHILLIPS DECISION ON AREA
PRICING AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROBLEMS YET TO BE
RESOLVED
During the evolutionary period of workable producer regulation under
the Statement of General Policy, the Phillips case was again presented to
the Supreme Court and decided on May 20, 1963.72 One must remember
69. Order Ruling Upon Motion Relating to Evidence to be Considered in Area
Rate Proceeding, 25 F.P.C. 614, 615 (1961). (Footnote omitted.)
70. Order denying motion and amending, in part, order relating to the type of
evidence to be considered in area rate proceeding, No. AR61-1.
71. Most respondents have made an offer of proof as to their individual costs, and
all have reserved their right to make such a showing later.
72. Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
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that while the Commission announced in its Phillips decision an intention
to abandon the old cost-of-service approach and replace it with a system of
pricing gas in group proceedings applicable to various sub-areas of the country,
the agency, nevertheless, decided the justness and reasonableness of past rate
increases, filed by Phillips under section 4 of the act, on a cost-of-service
basis. At the same time, however, the Commission dismissed the investiga-
tion it had instituted under section 5 of the act to determine just and
reasonable rates to be observed by Phillips in the future with the announce-
ment that such rates would be determined later in the area rate proceedings
to be initiated. Thus, although on appeal neither the validity of area pricing
nor any area price was squarely before the Court, the unusual posture of
the case made it virtually impossible for the Court to sustain the Commission
without imputing some degree of validity to area pricing, because the ques-
tion of whether the Commission abused its discretion in dismissing the
section 5 investigation entailed an inquiry into the justifications for the area
pricing concept. With both public and private interests of considerable
magnitude hanging in the balance, the judiciary did not elect to be oblique.
In an opinion the Supreme Court later found to be "thorough and in-
formative" 73 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had
sustained the Commission on November 30, 1961.74 (Conspicuous in its
absence was any reference by the court to its earlier City of Detroit75 deci-
sion.) The court of appeals accepted the reasoning reflected in the early
views of Mr. Justice Jackson, heavily relied upon by the Commission, on the
implausibility of the rate-base method. "Mr. Justice Jackson once wrote that
'there is little more relation between the investment and the result than in
a game of poker.' ,,76 The court of appeals did approve the cost-of-service
disposition relating to the section 4 proceedings and the finding that none
of Phillips contracts were unduly discriminatory. As to the determination of
future rates (section 5) the court of appeals noted the Commission's intention
to accomplish this by the area price method, and stated that since Congress
confided the regulation of the natural gas industry to the Commission, it
would be foolish to hold the Commission bound "to apply to new conditions
the methods and measurements designed and used for other and different
regulatory purposes." "We think it is clear that the Commission had ample
authority to embark upon an effort to design suitable new standards for use
73. Id. at 302.
74. Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
75. Judge Fahy, the author of that opinion, dissented but had no quarrel with the
Commission's right to undertake the area experiment; nor did he believe the Com-
mission would be precluded from applying the area method in the future if required to
decide the present case on cost of service.
76. 303 F.2d at 383.
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in the regulation of producers when it found that the tools at hand were not
suited to this purpose."
'77
The court carefully admonished that any new standard established would
have to meet the test of the constitutional standard :78
Of course, constitutional restrictions apply; rates fixed by
governmental authority cannot be confiscatory; all procedures must
be by due process, that term conveying meanings differing accord-
ing to the basic nature of the proceeding but always including that
which is fair and decent according to the standards of our social
order and time.
79
Language in the opinion suggests the advisability of permitting the Com-
mission to select a method other than the traditional public-utility approach
of measuring a "fair return"-
Almost the whole of the economics of merchandising differs
from the economics of public utility service. Are the just and reason-
able prices of such a merchandiser limited to fair returns on his own
investment and prices paid by him (and, if so, what investment and
what prices), or are those prices reasonably measured by the fair
prices for the product as measured by the open competitive market
for the product, evaluated by Commission expertise and data on
the whole of the market operation? Either criterion is a method
of regulation. It seems to us that the choice must lie with the Com-
mission.80
Thus, earlier Supreme Court decisions were not read as commanding any
single method of regulation under the broad terms of the act, but the court
expressly left open the way to challenge the results of any area rate.
The Supreme Court affirmed,8 five-to-four, giving the various issues
much the same treatment they received in the court of appeals. The Court
observed that the Commission's actions since the original Phillips case, the
validity of the Policy Statement, and the lawfulness of the area pricing method
were not before the Court for review, but "[tlo a limited extent these matters
do bear upon the propriety of the Commission's decision to terminate this
section 5(a) proceeding."8 2 Within the issue of abuse of discretion the
opinion discusses the area approach (likewise discussed in the briefs and at
length during oral argument) :
If we believed that such a departure from present concepts had
little, if any chance of being sustained, we would be hard pressed
77. Id. at 387.
78. See FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1942).
79. 303 F.2d at 388.
80. Ibid.
81. Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
82. Id. at 308.
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to say that the Commission had not abused its discretion in ter-
minating this Section 5(a) proceeding while undertaking the area
experiment. . . . But to declare that a particular method of rate
regulation is so sanctified as to make it highly unlikely that any
other method could be sustained would be wholly out of keeping
with this Court's consistent and clearly articulated approach to the
question of the Commission's power to regulate rates.
83
Citing its Natural Gas Pipeline, Hope, and Colorado Interstate decisions,
the Court reiterated that no single method need be followed by the Com-
mission in considering the justness and reasonableness of rates.
More specifically, the Court has never held that the individual
company cost-of-service method is a sine qua non of natural gas
rate regulation. . . . To whatever extent the matter of costs may
be a requisite element in rate regulation, we have no indication
that the area method will fall short of statutory or constitutional
standards.8
4
Reference was made to the Commission's goal of rates based on "the reason-
able financial requirements of the industry" in each area, and to statements
made during oral argument to the effect that composite cost-of-service data
would be considered in area rate proceedings. In a footnote the Court men-
tioned that it did not interpret the City of Detroit case to require the cost-
of-service method in independent producer regulation. 5 In that case there
was no question before the court relating to the area rate method. The
Court cited Mr. Justice Jackson's opinions in the Hope and Colorado Inter-
state cases, demonstrating the difficulties inherent in regulating the price of a
commodity such as natural gas, to support acceptance of the Commission's
conclusion that the individual rate-base method is not feasible or suitable for
producer rate regulation, and shared the Commission's hopes that the
area approach would ultimately prove more satisfactory.86
The dissent agreed that the cost-of-service method is not the "sine qua non
of natural gas rate regulation," but believed that abandonment of the old
approach in summary fashion would leave producers without effective regula-
tion for a number of years. Serious legal questions occurred to the dissent
concerning the validity of area pricing, and the majority's strong implica-
tion of its validity struck the minority as premature. The contemplated
averaging of costs to arrive at an area rate created the principal constitutional
difficulty envisioned. The four dissenting Justices believed that any area rate
order must include a showing that the individual producer will recover his
83. Id. at 308-09.
84. Id. at 309.
85. Id. at 310 n.16.
86. Id. at 310.
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costs; otherwise the order would be confiscatory and illegal. In addition, the
dissent pointed out that the individual producer could not be precluded from
offering relevant proof of his costs to meet his burden of proving that his
rates were just and reasonable.
Though one should not lose sight of the sharp division of the Supreme
Court over the legality of the area approach, the majority found the new
method of price regulation to be within the scope of the Commission's statu-
tory power, in effect approving the adoption of a pragmatic standard in the
regulation of producer rates.87 The necessities of practicality explain the
Court's approval: first, the administrative burden of regulating the individual
rates of several thousand producers looms enormous; secondly, the business
of producing natural gas simply does not lend itself to traditional rate-base
calculations which produce any meaningful result. Although the Court found
"no indication that the area method will fall short of statutory or constitu-
tional standards," no just and reasonable area rate has as yet been deter-
mined. Any area rate promulgated must not be arbitrary; it must satisfy both
statutory and constitutional requirements. Establishing the rates will be an
extremely demanding task.
Many parties to the area proceeding continue to advance every possible
argument against the area concept including the contention that the re-
quirements of procedural due process are violated by group hearings. The
second Phillips decision accepts, however, the adoption of a group procedure;
and the Court on other occasions approved group rate-making under "just
and reasonable" rate statutes.88 Due process does include all "which is
fair and decent according to the standards of our social order and time." 9
Of course the Commission must afford every opportunity for all to be heard.
Controversy over the area rate philosophy centers on the question ot
whether any rate order which comports with the revenue requirements of
the group as a whole must be struck down as not meeting the requirements
of substantive due process if the mandate does not provide a "fair return"
for each individual in the group. Assuming the validity of the order so far
as it relates to those who receive just remuneration, would any producer
.who could recover his costs under the rate order be entitled to an increment
above the ceiling to avoid a "taking of property" in violation of the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution."0 Any discussion of this
87. For an excellent treatment of the question of price fixing vis-a-vis rate making,
see Higgins, The Legality of F.P.C. Regulation of Independent Gas Producers by Area
Price Fixing, 50 GEo. L.J. 250 (1961).
88. Taag Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930); The New
England Divisions Case, 261 U.S. 184 (1923).
184 (1923).
89. Wisconsin v. FPC, 303 F.2d 380, 388 (1961).
90. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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question of confiscation should be divided on the basis of the validity and
effect of an area rate order as to (1) new contracts entered into after the
establishment by the Commission of the area price and (2) contracts which
were in existence prior to the establishment of the area price.91
With regard to new contracts, the producers are under no obligation
to, commit their gas to jurisdictional sales in interstate commerce; a choice
to seek nonjurisdictional intrastate markets is available.9 2 Thus, the five
Justices who constituted the najority in the Supreme Court's second Phillips
decision should encounter little difficulty in sustaining the constitutionality
of area price regulation of new sales.
In Bowles v. Willingham,93 the Supreme Court upheld the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942,' 4 which authorized the fixing of maximum housing
rentals under a "generally fair and equitable" standard on a class rather than
an individual basis, even though some landlords would not be provided with
fair rentals. A "taking" of property was not involved in this class regulation,
because seciton 4(d) of the act specifically provided that "nothing in this
Act shall be construed to require any person to sell any commodity or to
offer any accommodations for rent."9 5 By analogy, a producer's voluntary
election to make a sale subject to area price regulation by the Federal Power
Commission could not result in a confiscation or taking of his property.
Jurisdictional sales in existence prior to the Commission's determination
of just and reasonable area prices present an entirely different question.
Once a producer commences a jurisdictional sale of gas, he cannot abandon
the transaction without approval of the Commission and a finding under
section 7 (b) 96 of the act "that the available supply of natural gas is depleted
to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the
present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment. '97
Producers are not afforded a choice of seeking a nonjurisdictional market.
91. It is recognized that there is disagreement over the scope of an area hearing
as to whether rate filings made after the institution of the hearing and not consolidated
therein should nevertheless be included in the order; however, it is believed that the
answer to this question will turn on the validity of area rate-making itself.
92. This freedom of choice is clearly demonstrated by the Catco case, where the
Supreme Court observed that the filing of a certificate application does not constitute a
dedication to the interstate market, and that a producer is free, within the terms of his
contract, to refuse a conditional certificate proposed by the Commission. 360 U.S. at
387, 388.
93. 321 U.S. 503 (1944). Since Bowles was decided on the basis of the war power,
the case is of little precedential value in determining the constitutional limits of price-
fixing.
94. Ch. 26, § 2(b), 56 Stat. 23.
95. 321 U.S. at 517.
96. 52 Stat. 824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1958).
97. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960); Sun Oil Co. v.
FPC, 364 U.S. 170 (1960).
[Vol. 68
GAS PRODUCER RATES
If reasonable area prices determined without regard to the needs or costs
of an individual producer require him to reduce his contract price to a level
which is confiscatory as to his production, an unconstitutional taking of his
property has occurred.
The Commission may take the view that in instances where just and
reasonable area prices would result in the confiscation of a producer's property,
the constitutional issue can be- avoided by permitting the producer to aban-
don service.98 However, would this constitute a solution to the problem? Most
producers commit their gas to the interstate pipeline companies under long-
term contracts, usually for a period of twenty years or more. Although the
Commission possesses the power to permit an abandonment of service, serious
doubt exists as to the power that could be exercised in a manner contrary to
existing contract rights between producers and the pipeline companies. In the
landmark case, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp.,99 the
Supreme Court pointed out that the Natural Gas Act evidences no purpose
to abrogate private rate contracts and except for the Commission's power to
review the reasonableness of rates the contractual powers of the parties are
no different than they would be in the absence of the act. The opinion com-
ments upon the purpose of the act, "By preserving the integrity of contracts,
it permits the stability of supply arrangements which all agree is essential
to the health of the natural gas industry." 100 Apparently, with respect to
existing contracts, to avoid an unconstitutional taking of property through
area price regulation the Commission must employ some escape device other
than abandonment of service.
Supreme Court decisions relating to group regulation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission mention that an individual carrier should be afforded
the opportunity of showing that a group rate is not just and reasonable as
to his operations. For example, in The New England Divisions Case'01 the
Court attached to a group rate determination by the ICC a rebuttable presump-
tion of reasonableness with regard to individual carriers, saying, "[ S ] erious in-
justice to any carrier could be avoided by availing of the saving clause which
allows anyone to except itself from the order, in whole or in part, on proper
showing.' 02 The Supreme Court, in North Carolina v. United States10 3 com-
98. See statements of the Commission's General Counsel made at oral argument
before the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963). Record, p. 66.
This suggestion has been implemented more specifically in the initial brief of the Com-
mission's staff, pp. 34, 36 in the Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding, 24 F.P.C. 1121
(1960).
99. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
100. Id. at 344.
101. 261 U.S. 184 (1923).
102. Id. at 200.
103. 325 U.S. 507 (1945).
1964]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
mented upon a similar rate determination by the ICC: the "very nature of
such a broad general order requires that it contain a saving clause for
future modification and adjustment of particular rates."'1 4 Whether the
Federal Power Commission will include a saving clause in its determination
of area rates remains to be seen. 10 5
Other issues pertaining to area rates which will come before the Supreme
Court include the question of whether the Commission, in granting a pro-
ducer a temporary certificate to initiate a new sale, can impose a condition
denying the producer the right to file under section 4 of the Natural Gas
Act for contractually authorized price increases in excess of the Commission's
interim, guideline area prices. The Supreme Court has granted a petition for
writ of certiorari to a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
striking down the imposition of this condition. 0 6 The Court of Appeals
recognized that its decision would make it difficult for the Commission to
hold the line on producers' prices in accordance with the instructions of the
Supreme Court's Catco decision; however, "if the Commission may set aside
section 4 and the rights, privileges and protections which it accords to a
natural gas company subject to all of the obligations of the Act, then there
is no end to the legislative tampering which the Commission may under-
take."
0 7
The foregoing material reflects some of the many problems encountered
in area price regulation of producers. Other and more difficult problems will
undoubtedly arise as the Commission continues its task of attempting to regu-
late the sale of a commodity by thousands of different producers with diver-
gent interests and costs. It can be hoped that the best efforts of all interests
will eventually devise an acceptable method of fixing gas prices on an area
basis which can be functional within the framework of the Natural Gas Act
and at the same time, satisfy the requirements of due process of law.
104. Id. at 518.
105. In its Order Ruling Upon Motion Relating to Evidence to be Considered in
Area Rate Proceeding the Commission held this question to be premature, but stated
that it would not allow an individual cost-of-service presentation under any saving
clause. 25 F.P.C. 614, 616-17 (1961).
106. H. L. Hunt v. FPC, 306 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 32 U.S.L.
WEEK 3126 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1963) (No. 273).
107. 306 F.2d at 344.
